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A B S T R A C T
The geopolitical context, which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War, combined with Korea’s growing economic prowess, enabled greater dy-
namism and diversiﬁcation in Seoul’s foreign policy-making. Growing pressure from energy-
intensive economies coupled with new developments and investment in logistics and
infrastructure has brought different parts of the Eurasian landmass closer together in recent
years. Inter-Asian connections are especially growing. This article uses the case of deep-
ening relations between Korea and the post-Soviet Central Asian republics as a vantage point
to reﬂect on one such example of unfolding Asian inter-connectedness. In addition it sees
Seoul’s engagement in the region as a ﬁtting example of Korea’s broader ambitions to assert
itself as a global economic player. The article shows that Korea’s policy toward Central Asia
has been primarily driven by energy needs and is deﬁned by pragmatism. It ﬁnds that the
economic dimension of the relationship has greatly overshadowed other aspects such as
politics and security. In its pursuit of closer ties with the region Seoul has sought to turn
structural weaknesses into added value and has attempted to develop a distinctive, non-
threatening proﬁle built around the lack of a political baggage and geopolitical ambitions,
and the desire to share its experience of formerly impoverished turned leading economy.
In turn, Central Asia’s selective integration in the world economy has continued, also thanks
to its ties with Korea. The Central Asian republics welcomed the opportunity to diversify
their foreign relations, the sources of foreign investment and export routes. At the same
time the opaque business environment, a leadership succession, which cannot be post-
poned for much longer, and Seoul’s “no-strings attached” approach expose Korea to some
risks as regime stability might not last forever.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction
Uzbekistan’s President IslamKarimov’s visit to South Korea
in May 2015, where he met with his South Korean counter-
part President Park Geun-Hye, was the ﬁrst trip abroad for
Karimov after theMarchpresidential elections, and the seventh
visit he has paid to the country. The aim of the visit was to
deepen economic cooperation between the two countries, ﬁnd
ways for increasing industrialmodernization inUzbekistan, and
develop infrastructure (IHS, 2015). In turn, Korea has tradi-
tionally ascribed great importance to Uzbekistan, as a key
investor in the country and an important commercial partner.
This is just the most recent of the many presidential visits
between Korea and Central Asia over the years. In 2014 Pres-
ident Park toured the region, stopping in Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Former President Lee Myung-
bak also visitedCentral Asia in 2009, a focal area of his “resource
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diplomacy”, prior to the late President RohMoo-hyunwhohad
held high-levelmeetings in Kazakhstan in 2004 before launch-
ing the Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative, Korea’s ﬁrst
strategy toward the region. Central Asian presidents also fre-
quently visit Korea.
This paper uses the case of Korea–Central Asia relations
to reﬂectongrowing inter-AsianconnectednessandonSeoul’s
partial re-orientation of its foreign policy, fuelled by com-
mercial and energy needs. To this end, the paper asks why
Central Asia unexpectedly becamean important region of in-
terest to South Korea, and investigates the rationale behind
Seoul’s penetration in the region and its dimensions, the op-
portunities this presents, the rivalries it generates, and the
positive and negative externalities that result from deepen-
ing ties.Morebroadly, engagement inCentral Asia constitutes
a case of Korea’s re-orientation of its foreign policy, of its am-
bitions toplay a greater role internationally, especially inAsia,
and beyond the conﬁnes of its immediate neighborhood
(Cheongwadae, 2009; MOFA, 2014). The paper shows that
consistentlywith itsnarrativeof apooraid-dependentcountry
turned wealthy and donor, Korea has used oﬃcial aid assis-
tance as a tool to penetrate a new and faraway region. To be
clear, Korea and Central Asia were an unknown quantity to
each other, and the development of such a close relation-
ship was far from a foregone conclusion. The claims in this
respect are two-fold. First, Korea’s approach to Central Asia
hasbeendrivenbya considerabledegreeof pragmatism,with
little concern for questions of the region’s lack of democra-
cy and the widespread corruption that pervades the local
economies and political systems. Second, the Central Asian
states have used the opportunity of growing multipolarism
in the region to diversify export routes and sources of in-
vestment, aswell as carveout signiﬁcant foreignpolicyniches
– andmargins of maneuver – for themselves. All this served
one important purpose: domestic regime survival.
The paper is structured as follows. First, the back-
ground to Seoul’s greater ambitions and assertiveness
beyond its neighborhood is revisited. The paper subse-
quently outlines the establishment of relations between
Seoul and the Central Asian republics. Next, the links
between Korea and the region are examined, with special
attention to aid, trade, and investment. Then Korea’s ap-
proach is compared to that of the two other big East Asian
players, China and Japan, so that Seoul’s distinctive ap-
proach is teased out and its added value identiﬁed. Final
remarks conclude.
2. The diversiﬁcation of Central Asian foreign policies
Koreanswere not an unknownquantity to Central Asians
at the time the ﬁve republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan attained inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union in 1991. A Korean presence
on the territory of the then Russian empire was ﬁrst es-
tablished in the early 1860s, when Korean farmers and
peasantswere ﬂeeing landowners andmoneylenders on the
Korean peninsula, at the time under the rule of the Joseon
dynasty. In 1937 Soviet Koreanswere among the ﬁrst popu-
lations to be deported by Stalin, and in the fall that year they
were forcibly resettled to the Central Asian steppes. While
small numbers reached even Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan, it was in Soviet Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan that
the majority found a new home (Khan, 1995, 1998; Kim,
1999, 2000). After mobility restrictions were lifted in the
post-Stalin era the Koryo saram (or Koryoin, as the “Soviet
Koreans” were also called) soon urbanized and turned into
a Russiﬁed community. In the wake of independence there
was an expectation that old severed ties between the local
Koreans and the alleged ancestral homeland would be re-
stored. This proved problematic since the Soviet Koreans
never came from the Korean peninsula, but were rather the
descendants of those Koreans settled in the Russian Far East,
in the areas of Khabarovsk andVladivostok.However, Central
Asia was their home (Diener, 2006). In the wake of Central
Asian independence, Korea set up a number of programs
aimed at reviving cultural identity among a Russiﬁed di-
aspora community.1 Links between Korea and the diaspora
were also often invoked during frequent visits by South
Korean oﬃcials to the region (Ko, 2009).
However, it was not the ethnic Korean dimension that
drove the development of relations between Central Asia
and South Korea (Fumagalli, 2011). Independence and
growing international attention due to the quest for energy
from powers old and new, close and afar, opened new op-
portunities for engagement and for diversifying foreign
policy ties. The fact that in the end no zero-sum game de-
veloped in Central Asia, and that all major powers co-
existed (Cooley, 2012), allowed both the diversiﬁcation of
foreign policy and economic ties on the side of the Central
Asian states, and also the entry of relatively new actors, like
Korea or Japan, on the other.
The lowest amount of activism in foreign policy terms
can be seen in the cases of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality (Anceschi, 2010) meant
a self-imposed isolation and a very low level of integra-
tion in either the global economy and international (or even
regional) institutions. At the same time Ashghabat use
foreign economic relations and energy export routes as an
alternative to foreign policy-making. This led to a gradual
repositioning away from Moscow toward China, on which
Turkmenistan now closely depends, induced by the fact that
most of Turkmen gas exports now go eastward. Gradually
the country has also opened up to Korean investment, which,
however, promising and increasing (Reuters, 2014), remains
negligible compared to neighboring Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan (see Tables 1 and 2 ). Tajikistan, after emerging from
the civil war of the 1990s, has remained a close partner of
the Russian Federation, on whose support (economic, se-
curity) it so closely depends.
Similar to the case of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan’s ties with
Korea remain marginal. Kazakhstan has explicitly adopted
a multi-vectorial foreign policy, through which it has sought
to preserve good ties with Russia and a wide range of new
1 Seoul has invested considerably in cultural diplomacy too, such as cul-
tural exchanges, training programs and scholarships. The Korea Foundation,
the Academy of Korean Studies, and the Overseas Koreans Foundations all
have programs that are available to Korean diasporic communities. In order
to avoid what at present remains a speculative discussion based on an-
ecdotal evidence of the impact of Korea’s soft power, this paper does not
examine this dimension of Korea’s engagement in the region. For work
on Korea’s soft power, see Lee (2012), Lee (2013), Lee and Melissen (2011),
and Kim and Marinescu (2015).
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actors, from China to the US to the EU and Korea. Like-
wise, Kyrgyzstan has cultivated warm ties with Russia while
maintaining good relations with the west. Yet in recent years
western inﬂuence has declined to the advantage of Russian
and Chinese inﬂuence (Fumagalli, 2016). Uzbekistan has
been the more active and dynamic internationally, alter-
nating cozy ties with the Kremlin with warm relations with
Washington (Fumagalli, 2007). In short, the Central Asian
republics have developed different foreign policy posi-
tions. What they share in this diversity is the rationale
behind their foreign policy conduct. Here the paramount
concern has been regime survival (Cooley, 2014). In the post-
Cold War geopolitical environment they exploited the
increasingmultipolar regional environment to their own ad-
vantage. In this respect South Korea has established itself
as a reliable partner of the Central Asian states unlikely to
exert any pressure on domestic political issues. “The rise of
new external actors in the areas of trade, ﬁnance, and de-
velopment assistance has further empowered these states
to oppose externally enforced conditions and western calls
for economic and political reforms.” (2014, p. 242). As will
be shown in the pages below, Korea’s involvement has
contributed to the diversiﬁcation of Central Asia’s foreign
policy ties, export routes, and sources of investment.
3. The making of a global economic player
The analytical entry point for this paper is the debate
surrounding the (partial) re-orientation of South Korea’s
foreign policy following the end of the Cold War, most
notably its foreign economic relations (Heo & Roehrig, 2014;
Kang, 2014; Watson 2011), and the greater assertiveness,
in the region and beyond it, that has accompanied this
process. The engine behind this shift has been Seoul’s greater
economic prowess.
Although much has been written, for obvious reasons,
about Korea’s military security and the threat that North
Korea has posed to the South’s survival, security for Korea
has for long understood in bothmilitary and economic terms
(Evans, 2012, p. 67). The hard-security dimension is rather
self-evident owing to the legacy of the Korean War, the
divided peninsula, the presence of both a sizeable mili-
tary US contingent in the southern part of the peninsula and
a highly militarized state north of the 38th parallel. Without
questioning the importance of all these issues, a growing
number of scholars in Korea have also acknowledged how
that energy insecurity constitutes a key cause of vulnera-
bility for Korea (Kim, Shin, & Chung, 2011; Park, 2009; Sung,
2011; Cho et al., 2010). Without taking this dimension into
consideration it would be diﬃcult to make sense of Korea’s
penetration in faraway regions, such as Central Asia (and
more recently Azerbaijan) and even Africa and Latin America
(Darracq & Neville, 2014). An “energy poor country with an
energy intensive economy, Korea is forced to import the vast
majority of its energy resources” (Evans, 2012). Typically
this has meant importing energy from distant hubs in the
Middle East. To this end Korea has had to compete with
equally hungry giant neighbors such as China and Japan. As
Calder and Kim (2008) note, “the three core elements of
Korean energy security are: Dependence on imported oil,
coal and gas due to lack of domestic resources; dispropor-
tionate reliance on ME, and intensifying competition with
its neighbors to secure energy resources” (p. 1).
Investment in renewables domestically and possibly tap
in its ownminimal coal reserves and wind farms. This helps
in reducing the dependence on energy imports, but only to
a very limited extent (Kim, Shin, & Chung, 2011). Korea’s
margins of maneuver to address this predicament were
limited during the Cold War, but this changed almost over-
night in the late 1980s and the early 1990s as the Soviet
Union opened up (in need of investment and aid) and sub-
sequently disintegrated.2
In order to understand Korea’s quiet but steady asser-
tiveness in foreign economic relations one has to recall two
developments. The ﬁrst, domestically, is the country’s me-
teoric rise from one of the world’s poorest economies in the
early 1960s, dependent on investment from the US and
Japan, to one of the world’s leading economies, no longer
2 South Korea quickly displaced the North as the Soviet Union’s com-
mercial partner in the late 1980s, culminating in the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul in 1990, much to Pyong-
yang’s displeasure.
Table 1
Main imports and exports (2012).
Imports from Korea
(item; %)
Exports to Korea
(item; %)
Kazakhstan Cars 11 Titanium 29
Vehicle parts 9 Ferroalloys 27
Broadcasting
accessories
13 Raw aluminum 17
Reﬁned copper 8
Kyrgyzstan Cars 14 Reﬁned petroleum 45
Trucks 12 Nuts 26
Fabric 26
Tajikistan Cars 37 Raw aluminum 50
Trucks 14 Tanned sheep and
goat hides
23
Large construction
vehicles
13
Turkmenistan Cars 27 Integrated circuits 54
Buses 10 Cotton 35
LCVs 4
Uzbekistan Vehicle parts 43 Fertilizers 27
Cars 11 Radioactive
chemicals
15
Cotton 21
Source: Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT (https://atlas.media
.mit.edu/en/).
Table 2
Korean FDI in Central Asia (1992–2013).
Announced amount
(USD in million)
No. of Korean
enterprises operating in
the country
Kazakhstan 3400 234
Kyrgyzstan 164 68
Tajikistan 63 11
Turkmenistan 45 1
Uzbekistan 976 208
Source: Korea Export-Import Bank (http://211.171.208.92/odisas
_eng.html).
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aid-dependent but rather aid-providing (Kang, 2014). As
former President Lee puts it, “the Republic of Korea wants
to give back to the international community evenmore than
what it has ever received. The Republic of Korea stands ready
to extend a helping hand to those who are in need […].”
Lee (2009).
The second factor, which enabled greater ambitions and
assertiveness on the Korean side, was geopolitical change.
Kang (2014) recalls that:
the geopolitical environment during the Cold War con-
strained Korea’s foreign economic relations… The Korean
government has never pursued foreign economic poli-
cies separately from other strategic, political, and security
considerations: this tradition remains a critical element
for understanding Korea’s current and future foreign eco-
nomic policies (p. 203).
Economic ties were heavily directed toward the US and
Japan. The end of the Cold War was in this respect a cata-
lyst for change. Responding to this changing economic
geography, the Korean government has tried to strength-
en its economies ties with China, ASEAN and new regions,
especially with South and Central Asia, so as to secure more
energy resources and broaden its own production and in-
vestment networks. This process of diversiﬁcation was
slowed down by the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in the late 1990s,
but gained again momentum in the 2000s, as the Korean
economy recovered (Rabelland, 2000). These efforts,
however, do not necessarily imply that the government’s
focus has moved away – or will do so in any signiﬁcant way
– from its close cooperation with the United States, espe-
cially in the security realm. At the same time this has led
to Korea conceiving itself as an increasingly global eco-
nomic player. In this context, engagement in Asia (beyond
East Asia, that is) is crucial to understand Korea’s new role,
its new ambitions and the outward projection of its do-
mestic economic prowess (Heo & Roehrig, 2014; Lee, 2010).
In practice this has meant that, “strengthening a multi-
track foreign economic strategy” (Kang, 2014, p. 206).
From this perspective Central Asia matters signiﬁ-
cantly to Korea. The region is rich in natural reserves: it is
estimated to be home to 3% of the world’s oil reserves and
6% of the world’s gas reserves, while Uzbekistan is home
to 2% of the world’s uranium reserves (Evans, 2012, p. 71).
Central Asia not only provides oil, gas, uranium imports,
which are key to addressing energy insecurity, but is also
amarket with promising potential growth. Moreover, despite
the fact that trade turnover is still imbalanced, Korea trades
commodities such as oil and gas for plastic manufactures,
consumer goods, electronics, cars, and heavy machinery, as
shown in Table 1 below. Economic complementarities lie
at the core of this evolving and deepening relationship. As
Evans (2012) put it, “the complementarities of this three-
pronged strategy (diplomacy, trade, aid) are undergirded by
Korea’s motivation to increase its global diplomatic voice
to a level commensurate to its economic position” (p. 72).
The next sections map the development and consolida-
tion of links between Korea and the Central Asian republics,
before moving on to place Korea’s engagement in the
region in the broader comparative East Asian context. An
assessment of the opportunities and challenges that arise
from such engagement follows. Diplomatic relations were
established fairly swiftly in 1992; however, in the follow-
ing decade, Koreamaintains a relatively low proﬁle, ascribing
priority to ties with Uzbekistan, whereas relations with all
other four republics remained at a marginal level.
3.1. Roh Moo-hyun’s comprehensive Central Asia initiative
Korea had already started paying attention to the Central
Asian region in the1990s, althoughengagement sloweddown
considerably in the second half of the decade because of the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis. For a proper holistic approach to the
region one had to wait until late President Roh Moo-hyun
(2003–2008). Following two visits to Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan in 2004 and 2005, respectively, in December 2005
the Korean government launched a Central Asia confer-
ence, in which participants from both state and private
organizations participated. The outcomewas the “Compre-
hensive Central Asia Initiative,” later adopted by the cabinet
in 2006, which aims to “establish a staging point in Central
Asia for advancement to the Eurasian continent; [and] secure
long-term supply of energy resources” (Ko, 2009). To those
ends, the plan also envisaged “full exploitation of bilateral
relations strengthened through summit-level diplomacy; dif-
ferentiated approaches to individual states based onnational
characteristics; more synergy effects through closer collab-
oration between interrelated businesses and advancement
of industrieswith relative advantage; strengthening the legal
and systemic foundation for expansion of cooperative in-
frastructure and sharing of Korea’s economic development
experiences to establish strategic partnerships for national
development of the Central Asian nations” (Ko, 2009).
3.2. Lee Myung-bak’s New Asia Initiative
When former President Lee Myung-bak came to power
in 2009, Korea was “struck by high oil and raw minerals
prices.” Under his presidency Korea’s foreign policy grew
more ambitious and assertive, and resource diplomacy
became one of its deﬁning elements. The synergetic state–
private approach enabled private-sector representatives to
be deployed more extensively, supported by the public-
sector trade representation that was the leading element
of Korea’s diplomatic presence in these countries. In this way,
Seoul’s economic and diplomatic efforts took on a symbi-
otic relationship overseas (Snyder & Easley, 2014). In March
2009 President Lee launched a NewAsia Initiative to broaden
Seoul’s engagement in Asia Lee (2010). At a general level
the Initiative aims to broaden the horizon of Korea’s diplo-
macy, long-focused on the Paciﬁc and speciﬁcally on its
relationship with the US, North Korea and China and Japan.
Partnership with the ASEAN countries ﬁgures more promi-
nently, as well cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, and
the Central Asian countries. In a break with the past, the
initiative lays out a vision for a more assertive Korean lead-
ership in the political, security, and economic spheres. In
May 2009 Lee also announced a New Silk Road Initiative to
emphasize the strategic importance of Central Asia, par-
ticularly Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Korea Herald, 2009,
2010; Zhu, 2009). Consistently with Seoul’s earlier ap-
proach toward the region, the strategy refrained from
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bundling all countries in an undistinguished regional mass,
but rather tailored the approach to speciﬁc regions and coun-
tries. Building on its experience in the post-independence
period, Korea has focused on a few key countries (espe-
cially Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan more recently) and a
number of strategic sectors (most notably gas, uranium, and
petrochemicals).
3.3. Park Geun-hye’s Eurasia initiative
In October 2013, Seoul hosted the Global Cooperation
in the Era of Eurasia conference,where President Park (2013–
present) outlined her economic vision for the region.
Speciﬁcally, her “Eurasia Initiative” called for linking energy
and logistic infrastructure (such as rail networks, oil and gas
pipelines, andelectricity grids) across Europe andAsia. Under
the watchwords of “one continent, creative continent, and
peaceful continent,” the initiative projects a uniﬁed system
of transport, energy, and trade networks across the vast Eur-
asian continent (KoreaHerald, 2013; Park, 2013). AsPresident
Park put it:
Win-win Eurasian energy cooperation must be devel-
oped, such as linking energy infrastructures including
electricity grids, gas and oil pipelines, and co-developing
China’s shale gas and eastern Siberia’s petroleum and gas’.
[…] ‘Logistics and energy network in the Eurasian region
will not only reduce logistics costs and stimulate global
trade, but will also stabilize rawmaterials costs and con-
tribute to the growth of the world economy (Park, 2013).
To these ends, the strategy presupposes the development
of a “Silk Road Express,” which would connect rail and road
networks from Busan to Europe, as well as new sea routes
through the Arctic Ocean (Park, 2013). The initiative has the
ambition to be transformative in three key dimensions, as Kim
(2015) puts it. First, it calls for an integration of the Eurasian
economic space. This would open up newmarkets for Korea’s
companies, and in turn it could secure investment in logistics
and infrastructure for the local Central Asian economies. In se-
curity terms it attempts to unblock the impasse on the Korean
peninsula by trying to highlight the potential contribution of
North Korea (of which the South would be the direct beneﬁ-
ciary) inmultilateral projects. And ﬁnally, in geopolitical terms,
awestern axis reaching out to Russia, Central Asia and Europe
would complement the otherwise usually unbalanced geopo-
litical environment inwhichKoreaoperates, tilted towardChina
and the United States.
In sum, then, Roh, Lee and Park’s strategies have been
extremely ambitious, yet at the same time rooted in a re-
alistic reading of Korea’s economic needs and vulnerabilities.
The next section builds on this assessment to examine the
economic dimension of Korea’s penetration in the region,
which integrates a material component (e.g. aid, invest-
ment, and trade) with a more symbolic one, such as high-
level (summit) diplomacy.
4. Complementary economies, but a skewed
relationship
The Central Asian republics inherited diplomatic ties with
North Korea, but its inﬂuencewas quickly displaced by South
Korea’s greater attractiveness as an economicmodel and po-
tential as an investor. Diplomatic relations with the Republic
of Korea were soon established in 1992. In the ensuing years
Seoul adopted a carefully tailored strategy that avoided
“bundling the Central Asian states in a collection of
undistinguishable stans” (Fumagalli, 2012). Rather, Seoul ini-
tially ascribed special importance to relations with
Uzbekistan, followed in later years by ties to Kazakhstan.
Gradually, it moved on to encompass all ﬁve states in its
multi-pronged strategy toward the region.
4.1. Aid
Korean policy-makers have used the Oﬃcial Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) to create political goodwill and fertile
conditions for subsequent investment. International assis-
tance, Heo and Roehrig (2014, p. 183) contend, provided an
important boost to Korea’s economic growth. With eco-
nomic growth, Korea assumed a greater sense of
responsibility and a willingness to play a greater role in
maintaining international peace and stability. After several
decades during which Korea was an aid-recipient country,
in 1987 the country began to reverse the pattern. In 2009
the country was admitted to the Organization for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance
Committee (OECD-DAC), which essentially includes the
donor countries. Korea’s ODA is deliveredmostly in the form
of bilateral assistance, government-to-government, with a
smaller portion (about 25%) given to multilateral organi-
zations (e.g. UN and the World Bank’s International
Development Association). Technically, aid is channeled
through two instruments: the Korean International Coop-
eration Agency (KOICA) primarily and the Economic
Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF). The EDCF was es-
tablished in 1987, three years before Korea oﬃcially stopped
being a net aid recipient country; loans are dictated by the
Ministry of Finance. Grants are disbursed through KOICA,
and these are mandated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (MOFAT). Aid allocated to Eastern Europe and
Central Asia has increased signiﬁcantly over the years, rising
from 1% of all of Korea’s aid to 5.7% in 2011. As Fig. 1 below
shows, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have traditionally re-
ceived a considerable amount of ODA from Korea; both
countries were top recipients in 2011, whereas as of 2014
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan were the top recipients at USD2
million and USD6million respectively (and both were listed
in the top 26 priority countries). Korean ODA to Uzbeki-
stan has continued to increase over the years, whereas aid
to Kazakhstan had declined as the country’s economy grew
and Astana becamemore of a commercial partner to Korea.
The sectors receiving the bulk of Korea’s aid are energy and
industry (42.9% in 2011), with education in second place
at 23.6% (Evans, 2012, p. 73).
4.2. Trade
Trade turnover between Korea and Central Asia has in-
creased 180 times between 1992 and 2010 (Evans, 2012,
p. 77; see also Table 3). Most of Korea’s trade occurs with
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (54% and 38% respectively),
whereas commercial exchanges with Turkmenistan,
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain at negligible levels (5%,
2% and 1%, Chart 1).
What themacro-level picture does not reveal is that trade
is in all cases extremely skewed in favor of Korea (Korean
exports greatly exceed imports). Korea is currently Uzbeki-
stan’s fourth-largest commercial partner: over the past two
decades trade turnover between the two countries has sur-
passed USD5 billion, of which USD3 billion is represented
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Figure 1. Korean ODA to Central Asia (1992–2013). Source: KOICA Statistics (http://stat.koica.go.kr:8077/komis/jsptemp/ps/stat_index.jsp).
Table 3
Korea-Central Asia Trade (1992–2014, USD in thousand).
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
2014 1,467,727 164,342 51,311 193,143 2,059,819
2010 938,323 107,248 133,783 109,996 1,460,622
2005 514,161 68,106 14,965 15,370 521,923
2000 131,765 17,303 12,352 7778 334,402
1995 126,298 3120 14,373 7425 379,035
Source: Korea Customs Service (http://www.customs.go.kr/).
0
4,500,000
9,000,000
13,500,000
18,000,000
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Kyrgyzstan
Kazakhstan
Chart 1. Trade turnover between Korea and Central Asia (2014). Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association: http://global.kita.net/engapp/statistics/
board_sta_list.jsp?grp=S3&code=S3001).
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by Korean investment, with about 400 Korean ﬁrms oper-
ating in the country (Central Asia Newswire, 2012a;
Voloshin, 2012). Cooperation ranges from loans to support
for Tashkent’s media and medical sectors (Central Asia
Newswire, 2012b), and focuses on strategic partnerships in
a number of key sectors, with a special focus on hydrocar-
bons, minerals, and uranium, key to Korea’s nuclear power
plants (Table 1). Korea is also Kazakhstan’s fourteen-
largest trading partner, with trade turnover exceeding USD1
billion overall in 2011 and reaching almost USD1.5 billion
in 2014, doubling the exchanges compared to 2010
(Voloshin, 2012; Table 3).
4.3. Investment
In recent years deals have increased in number and size.
Investment has been uneven in the region, with Turkmeni-
stan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan marginally – and only
recently – beneﬁtting from Korean FDI, whereas Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top recipients
of Korean FDI (10th and 44th).
As Table 2 illustrates, Kazakhstan has been the largest
recipient of Korean Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), fol-
lowed by Uzbekistan (USD3.4 billion and USD976 million
respectively, for the period 1992–2015). During the Roh pres-
idency, in 2006, the Korean National Oil Corporation (KNOC),
Kogas and Uzbekneftegaz signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding that entailed exclusive exploration and
production rights in the Chust-Pap and Namangan-Terachi
gas ﬁelds. In 2007, the Korean Consortium for the Caspian
Oil Project, which includes SK, LG, Samsung and Daesung,
acquired a 27% share in the Zhambyl offshore block in co-
operation with Kazmunaigas. In 2008, Uzbekneftegaz and
Kogas signed a USD1.8 billion dollar agreement to explore
the Surgil gas ﬁeld.
Korea’s economic penetration of the region continued,
in fact accelerated, under Roh’s successor, Lee Myung-
bak, who made resource diplomacy a central component
of his tenure in oﬃce. In 2009, KNOC and Hyundai secured
a USD1.5 billion deal to build a gas treatment complex near
the super-giant Yolotan gas ﬁeld in Turkmenistan. These
agreements have paved the way for deeper cooperation, in-
cluding three headline deals signed during Lee’s tour of the
region in 2011. A USD4 billion agreement to build a petro-
chemical complex in Atyrau (western Kazakhstan); another
USD4 billion contract to build two power plants in Balkhash
(eastern Kazakhstan), expected to generate up to 7% of the
country’s electricity; and a USD4.1 billion agreement to
develop Uzbekistan’s Surgil gas ﬁeld. President Park also em-
phasized the potential the region holds for Korea’s
investment, and in her visit to Central Asia in the summer
of 2014, she focused on logistics and energy infrastruc-
ture. In Uzbekistan she signed USD8 billion-worth of deals
(gas, petrochemical plants, Surgil gas ﬁeld), and also reached
an agreement with the Uzbek government to raise Korea’s
uranium imports from 300 million tons to 500 million tons
in coming years.
In Kazakhstan, investment deals were signed in rela-
tion to the Balkash thermal power plant, Zhambyl oil and
gas ﬁelds, and a chemical plant in Atyrau. Even Turkmeni-
stan, long neglected by Korean investors, saw a sizeable USD4
billion deal between Turkmengaz-LG/Hyundai over the
building of a gas-processing plant. In total, Korea has in-
vested USD3 billion in several projects. Somewhat
controversially, aid and bilateral agreements have fol-
lowedmajor business deals for Korean conglomerates in the
region.
Korea has pursued different strategies in its Central Asian
investment. Most of investment in Uzbekistan is state-
driven, whereas private ﬁrms are the leading actors in the
case of Kazakhstan. Despite this difference, what is distinc-
tive in Korea’s case is the synergy between the state and
private actors, and also the peculiar role of the large indus-
trial conglomerates, the chaebols. Korea has complemented
its bilateral approach with multilateral diplomacy by es-
tablishing a Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum. The
Forum, originally founded in 2007 and held annually, aims
at “enhancing the relationship” between Korea and the ﬁve
republics by “initiating multilateral cooperative projects.”
In addition to the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum,
a Korea-Central Asia Caravan Event has also been held in
the region (MOFA, 2014, pp. 122–3). Open to oﬃcials, busi-
nessmen and NGOs, the event included (Korean) ﬁlm
festivals, taekwondo tournaments, and seminars on ﬁber in-
dustries. The forum was designed to enhance cooperation
in the educational, economic, and cultural ﬁelds and to build
networks between governments, business, and academia
across the region.
5. From opportunity to risk: challenges to Korea–
Central Asia relations
On the surface, close ties between Korea and the Central
Asian republics seem like a match made in heaven. Eco-
nomic complementarities are the result of Seoul’s energy
predicament and the Central Asian economies’ need for
capital (investment), technology and export markets. Re-
gardless of how realistic the goals laid out in her Eurasia
Initiative might be, President Park’s emphasis on logistics
and energy infrastructure represents a correct reading of the
situation on the ground. It is here that we can see Korea’s
distinctiveness and its added value when compared to other
actors. Although both the country’s resource diplomacy and
the economic predominance of the chaebols have come
under attack domestically in recent years (Financial Times,
2015; Haggard, Lim, & Kim, 2003; Lee, 2008; Reuters, 2012),
the particular and peculiar structure of the chaebols is ap-
pealing in Central Asia, where large industrial conglomerates
offer a number of needed services across business sectors.
In particular, the chaebols are able to ensure that trade ﬂows
by handling multiple (most, in fact) sides of each transac-
tion, including exporting capital equipment, ﬁnancing,
supplying infrastructure, and even ﬁnding export markets
(Calder & Kim, 2008). More generally, Korea’s record as a
country that went from being one of the world’s poorest
to one of its leading economies, and its lack of political
baggage (unlike Russia, the US, China or even Japan) have
contributed to Seoul’s positive image in the region. On the
material side, Seoul could offer a state-private synergetic ap-
proach that would deliver the capital and tech/know-how
that the Central Asian economies need. On a more sym-
bolic level, unlike Russia, South Korea does not have
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sweeping geopolitical ambitions in the region, and there-
fore carries far less baggage in its economic relationships.
Vis-à-vis China, its smaller size helps assuage local con-
cerns about “colonization.” Seoul has developed tailored
approaches for the needs and demands of individual states,
so that local republics do not feel bundled into a collec-
tion of “undistinguished stans.”
While Seoul’s incremental and tailored engagement
seems to be paying off, a number of challenges stand in the
way of further investment into the region. In the short-
term one obvious barrier is the sheer geographical distance
between Korea and Central Asia, a challenge only aug-
mented by the underdevelopment of physical infrastructure,
the local states’ reluctance to relax border controls and even
regional rivalries. In the medium term, leadership succes-
sion will become inevitable in the region, given that some
of the presidents (Karimov in Uzbekistan and Nazarbayev
in Kazakhstan) are ageing and there are no visible plans for
succession. Seoul has seemingly been too willing to pay the
“price of access” (Cooley, 2012) by de facto contributing to
authoritarian survival in order to enter high-risk markets
and opaque business environments. The costs of doing so
have become visible to ordinary Koreans in the wake of the
eruption of the “resource diplomacy scandal” in 2014–2015,
when former President Lee was accused of over-spending
resources with relatively minor results, often condoning
shady deals between Korean companies and the local Central
Asian elite circles (Financial Times, 2015). Koreans will also
have to resolve the fractiousness of their political system,
whereby any former president has to fear retribution by the
new winning side. Another factor, which might be worth
considering in the medium run, is Russia. Although Russia
is a relatively friendly environment for South Korean in-
vestment (and has been so from the late Soviet period),
Moscowmay set limits on external challengers to its former
hegemony, especially when tangible economic interests are
at stake. Russia might prove less keen to see a greater
number of external players consolidate their presence in
what it considers as its backyard. Finally, a more specula-
tive challenge –with obviously immediate repercussions but
also with an uncertain future – concerns North Korea and
its unreliability as a political and economic partner. Unless
Korea wishes to rely on sea lanes of communication for con-
necting Chinese ports to the southern part of the peninsula,
any serious project of Eurasian integration will have to pass
through the two Koreans. This would add to, rather than
decrease, Korea’s vulnerabilities.
6. Rivalries with other East Asian countries
“If viewed as a region of increasing multipolar inﬂu-
ence,” Alex Cooley observes, “the region’s un-mistakable shift
to the East” becomes apparent (Cooley, 2014, p. 256).
Yoshimatsu (2014) has noted that, “lingering historical an-
imosity reinforced by growing concerns about energy
security encourage Asian states to use economic instru-
ments such as trade, foreign aid, and commercial agreements
to pursue their key diplomatic objectives.” On a similar note,
Jain (2014) also notes that “Asia intense rivalry drives the
geopolitics of energy.” As such, there appears to be “minimal
gain in cooperating with other energy consumers” (Jain,
2014, p. 547). Despite Korea’s efforts (and interests) in fos-
tering Eurasia-wide energy cooperation, at present there is
little to suggest that the three main actors in East Asia are
either cooperating or envisaging cooperation when it comes
to pursuing a Central Asian agenda. And yet, the Central
Asian region differs markedly from East Asia in terms of how
– and the extent to which – rivalries between the threemain
East Asian players (China, Korea, and Japan) play out and
affect local dynamics. There is no great game understood
in terms of competition between external actors for inﬂu-
ence, presence, and resources.
China’s approach has been very pragmatic (Laruelle &
Peyrouse, 2013). Beijing has relied on amulti-pronged strat-
egy combining the close pursuit of bilateral ties and the use
of multilateral frameworks (such as the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization), where, at least formally, all players –
big and small – could feel equal. In this context, the Central
Asian states could manage relations with two much more
powerful players (China and Russia) at once. China has
chosen to advance its security agenda ﬁrst and has turned
toward energy and trade only recently (from the 2000s
onward).
Japan’s approach differs from that of China and Korea,
as Tokyo’s strategy has been hindered by the lack of a clear
conceptualization of its Central Asian approach in Japa-
nese policy circles and a lack of understanding thereof in
Central Asia. (Dadabaev, 2013, p. 532). The result has been
a ‘hybrid’ strategy, torn between pragmatism and a human
security approach, perhaps inevitably yieldingmixed results
(2013). Similar to Korea, Japan has provided the region with
considerable amount of assistance. The difference in the
amounts allocated to the region is staggering. In 2013 Korea
spent a total USD32 million for the entire Middle East and
Central Asian “region,” whereas Japan allocated USD26
million to Kazakhstan alone; Uzbekistan received USD6
million from Korea and USD22 million the same year (JICA,
2014).
When compared to the other East Asian countries also
active in the region, South Korea’s approach more closely
resembles China’s. This is because both actors appear to have
developed a purely pragmatic approach to their engage-
ment of the Central Asian region. Thanks to its “no strings
attached” policy, where economic support is not accom-
panied by political conditionality, Korea potentially competes
with China’s growing economic inﬂuence in the sense that
both countries are home to energy-intensive economies in
ever-greater need of natural resources, but also reﬂect a
belief that large integrated Korean ﬁrms enjoy an advan-
tage in providing a range of services to Central Asian partners
in complex investments (Cooley, 2014; Fumagalli, 2012, pp.
89–90). Korea is surely smaller and a late-comer to the
region, but has no geopolitical ambitions. Consequently, its
involvement has not raised the same suspicions, or reac-
tions, that attempts at establishing Western presence and
inﬂuence. In addition, Korea’s successful export-led indus-
trialization has made the country a potential development
model (Snyder & Easley, 2014). As to the United States,
Korea’s good ties with the Central Asian republics have
served Washington well. On the one hand Seoul’s inﬂu-
ence can be seen as a small yet signiﬁcant counter-balance
and an alternative to China’s otherwise endless expansion.
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On the other, Seoul has remained a dependable ally for
Washington, as the cooperation over the logistics hub in
Navoi (in central Uzbekistan) demonstrates (Tynan, 2009).
The upgrading of facilities at Navoi Airport from 2009
onward constituted not only an example of close
Uzbekistan–Korea economic cooperation, but it also ﬁts in
well in attempts to restore strategic cooperation between
Washington and Tashkent. The logistics hub at Navoi in
central Uzbekistan helped reconnect Uzbekistani–US co-
operation in the Afghanistan theater prior to the launch of
the Northern Distribution Network in 2009.
7. Conclusion
The paper has examined the evolution of South Korea–
Central Asian relations as a vantage point on growing inter-
Asian connectedness. In the Korean case, interest has been
driven by economic factors, namely the country’s energy vul-
nerabilities and paucity of domestic natural resources, as
well as the desire to ﬁnd new markets for local products.
Oﬃcial development assistance has been an important part
of the story of Korea, sharing its experience as a develop-
ing nation, turning into a major economic powerhouse and
returning to the international community what it had re-
ceived in moments of need. The provision of aid, in the form
of grants and loans, has contributed to creating a recep-
tive environment (business, regulatory, political) for Korean
investment, be it state, private, or mixed. Trade and invest-
ment have also expanded dramatically. Through an
empirically driven study of Korea–Central Asia relations the
paper has sought to contribute to recent reﬂections on
Korea’s energy security (Kim, Shin, & Chung, 2011) and how
the regionmight partly contribute to addressing Seoul’s vul-
nerabilities (Hak, 2009; Park, 2009; Sung et al., 2011; Cho
et al., 2010; Zhu 2007).
Through an analysis of links, rivalries and opportuni-
ties in Korea–Central Asia relations this paper advanced three
main arguments. First, the story of Korea’s involvement in
Central Asia speaks to the broader process of redeﬁnition
of South Korea’s role in global affairs (Watson, 2011; Heo
& Roehrig, 2014; Kang, 2014; Lee, 2012; Zhu, 2007). Seoul’s
engagement is relatively recent and is entirely out of the
traditional region,because Korea has – since the establish-
ment of the republic in 1948 – preoccupied itself,
understandably, with its immediate neighborhood where
it faces a threat to its survival in the form of the DPRK and
competitive relations and complicated historical legacies
with China and especially Japan. Together with a South-
East Asian trajectory (Steinberg, 2010), Central Asia has been
one of the two axes of a broader Asian engagement.
Second, greater activism and ambitions have not – thus
far – provoked a backlash by other players, including the
other big two East Asian states: China and Japan. Al-
though relations could potentially turn competitive soon
(especially with China), and cooperation remains very
limited, neither local actors nor other external players have
perceived Korea’s engagement as threatening. Korean policy-
makers have gone a considerable length, with some success,
to seek energy cooperation and ensure that all three coun-
tries can continue to pursue their own agendas without
encroaching on its other and without turning the pursuit
of their respective objectives into a zero-sum game. Finally,
South Korea has invested more in projecting its soft power,
although evidence about its impact in the region remains
anecdotal due to the paucity of reliable surveys, a topic that
could be the focus of future research.
Last but not least, the Central Asian states have openly
welcomed the presence of yet another actor in the regional
economic landscape. Korea’s involvement has contributed
to the diversiﬁcation of Central Asia’s foreign policy ties,
export routes, and sources of investment. As Cooley (2014)
notes, “far from being passive actors in the face of global-
ization andgreat power competition, Central Asiangoverning
elites and locally connected economic actors will continue
to ﬁnd newways of leveraging outsider actors” (p. 257). As
a result, “the rise of newexternal actors in the areas of trade,
ﬁnance, and development assistance has further empow-
ered these states to oppose externally enforced conditions
andwestern calls for economic andpolitical reforms” (Cooley,
2014, p. 242). This paper has illustrated how Seoul’s prag-
matic approach to foreign policy towards a new region has
worked in practice. To conclude by returning to the issue of
growing Asian interconnectedness, much – as always –
depends on how North Korea will evolve, since connec-
tions to both rail routes andpipelines dependonPyongyang’s
collaboration, involvement, and reliability as apartner. Failing
that, land-based Silk Roads of various kinds (so, with the
exception of sea lines of communication, inexpensive yet
time-consuming) will end at the Chinese–North Korean
border.
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